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For international peace and security, the international nuclear non-proliferation regime has
played an extremely important role. However, the recent state of affairs, including Iraqi and
North Korean issues, and a new U. S. nuclear policy under the Bush Administration, reveal
several challenges to the regime. In this paper, I examine the development of the situation
since the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and address eight specific challenges to
the regime. This paper argues that in order to strengthen the regime, it will be necessary to
maintain and strengthen international consensus and motivation toward the regime because
the regime ultimately depends on the commitment of States to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty.
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Introduction
In order to maintain regional and international security, enhancement of the nuclear
non-proliferation regime, among o血er measures, is a particularly important element.
The issue of nuclear non-proliferation is rather international than one among or between
states. The non-proliferation norm of behavior that the regime tries to establish and
reinforce depends on the commitment of States parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) to abide by their obligations under the Treaty. For the nuclear non-prolif-
eration regime to survive, it is necessary to keep and strengthen this international con-
sensus and motivation.
The spirit of the NPT is to achieve the nuclear non-proliferation norm through the
universal agreement of States not to proliferate rather than to prevent or contain the
acts by a State toward nuclear proliferation, such as U. S. policy of counterproliferation.
Many nuclear development activities are, by nature, dual use, i. e., they can support
both peaceful use and military application. This reality has been recognized from the
beginning. This recognition is best exemplified by President Eisenhower's "Atoms for
Peace" proposal which promised access to nuclear technology in exchange for a com-
mitment not to pursue military applications.
By the early 1960s, Ireland and Sweden that were not military powers submitted a
proposal for concluding a treaty to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons to
the United Nations. The nuclear weapon tests by France and China throughthe decades
of the 1960s provided increased impetus toward仇e conclusion of a non-proliferation
treaty, and the NPT entered into force in 1970. The NPT should be understood as a
treaty seeking to establish a nuclear non-proliferation regime based on the political
force of a broad international consensus rather than a treaty based on a military bal-
ance among the superpowers.
Just before the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, consciousness to respect
to and comply with the Treaty was very high. During this time, non-compliance by Iraq
and North Korea was recognized by international society, and the IAEA began discus-
sion on how to strengthen its safeguards system. The Conference resulted in a decision,
taken without a vote, to extend the treaty indefinitely. This strong endorsement of the
continuing importance and relevance of the NPT came in the aftermath of the non-
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compliance, in particular to prevent its recurrence.
Many non-nuclear-weapon States, in agreeing to the indefinite extension of the NPT,
were afraid that discriminatory nature of the Treaty would be extended indefinitely.
However, they recognized that nuclear disarmament could not be accomplished quickly
and that maintaining the NPT and the associated nuclear non-proliferation regime was
of overriding importance. The Conference, as a result, agreed on a document titled
"Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" as a way
to further enhance the effectiveness of the treatyl
Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament2'
( I ) Universality
Universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is an
urgent priority. All States not yet party to the Treaty are called upon to accede to the
Treaty at the earliest date, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear
facilities. Every effort should be made by all States parties to achieve this objective.
( 2 ) Non-Proliferation
The proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously increase the danger of nuclear
war. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons plays a vital role in pre-
venting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Every effort should be made to implement
the Treaty in all its aspects to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other
nuclear explosive devices.
( 3 ) Nuclear Disarmament
Nuclear disarmament is facilitated by an easing of international tension and the
1) On the analysis of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, see Lewis A. Dunn, "High Noon for the
NPT," Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 6, July/August 1995, pp. 3-9; John Simpson, "The Birth of a New
Era? The 1995 NPT Conference and the Politics of Nuclear Disarmament," Security Dialogue, Vol. 26, No. 3,
September 1995, pp. 247-256; Mitsuru Kurosawa, "Beyond the 1995 NPT Conference: A Japanese Point of
View," Osaka University Law Review, No. 43, February 1996, pp.ト12.
2) NPT/CONF. 1995!32 (Part I), 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document Part I, New York, 1995.
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strengthening of trust between States. The undertakings with regard to nuclear disarma-
ment as set out in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should thus
be fulfilled with determination. In this regard, the nuclear-weapon States reaffirm their
commitment, as stated in article VHo pursue in good faith negotiations on effective
measures relating to nuclear disarmament. The achievement of the following measures
is important in the full realization and effective implementation of Article VI.
(a) The completion bythe Conference on Disarmament of the negotiations on a uni-
versa! and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty no later than 1996. Pending the entry into force of a Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States should exercise utmost re-
straint.
(b) The immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-dis-
criminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
(c) The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progres-
sive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goals of eliminat-
ing those weapons.
( 4 ) Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones
The conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-
free zones enhances global and regional peace and security is reaffirmed. The develop-
ment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in regions of tension, such as in tie Middle
East should be encouraged. The establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones
by the time of the Review Conference in the year 2000 would be welcome. The coopera-
tion of all the nuclear-weapon States and their respect and support for the relevant pro-
tocols is necessary for the maximum effectiveness of such nuclear-weapon-free zones.
( 5 ) Security Assurances
Noting United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995), as well as the declara-
tions of the nuclear-weapon States concerning both negative and positive security assur-
ances, further steps should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to
the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These steps could take
the form of an internationally legally binding instrument.
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( 6 ) Safeguards
The International Atomic Energy Agency is the competent authority responsible to
verify and assure compliance to prevent diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses
to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. All States parties are required by
Article III of the Treaty to sign and bring into force comprehensive safeguards agree-
ments and those which have not yet done so should do so wi也out delay.
Decisions adopted by its Board of Governors aimed at further strengthening the effec-
tiveness of Agency safeguards should be implemented and the Agency's capability to
detect undeclared nuclear activities should be increased. New supply arrangements for
the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially
designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material
to non-nuclear-weapon States should require acceptance of the Agency's full-scope safe-
guards.
Nuclear fissile material transfe汀ed from military use to peaceful nuclear activities
should, as soon as practicable, be placed under Agency safeguards in the framework of
the voluntary safeguards agreements in place with the nuclear・weapon States.
( 7 ) Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
Particular importance should be attached to ensuring the exercise of the inalienable
right of allthe parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes. Undertakings to facilitate participation in the fullest pos-
sible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully implemented, In all activities
designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment should
be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty.
Transparency in nuclear-related export controls should be promoted within the frame-
work of dialogue and cooperation among all interested States party to the Treaty. All
States should maintain the highest practicable levels of nuclear safety, including waste
management, and observe standards and guidelines in nuclear materials accounting,
physical protection and transport of nuclear materials. Every effort should be made to
ensure that the International Atomic Energy Agency has the financial and human
resources necessary to meet effectively its responsibilities in the areas of technical
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cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety.
Implementation and development of the Principles and Objectives is indispensable to
maintain and strengthen the consensus for continuing enhancement of the NPT regime.
States participating in the 1995 NPT Review Conference expressed their respect for the
Treaty and their desire to maintain the effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation
regime.
At the 2000 NPT Review Conference3', the participants adopted a Final Document4'
which included practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement
Article VI ofthe NPT, paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on the Principles and
Objectives, the provision of negative security assurances, the establishment of nuclear-
weapon-free zones and the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The
document reflected the opinions of States party to the Treaty regarding也e progress
toward achievement of the Principles and Objectives during 5 years after the decision to
indefinitely extend the NPT.
Measures included in the Principles and Objectives of 1995 and the Final Document of
the 2000 NPT Review Conference provide suggestions regarding a Hyard stick" to evalu-
ate progress toward achievement of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament,
and identify future activities to be taken to enhance the NPT regime. The following
provides an analysis of the challenges to the nuclear non-proliferation regime with refer-
ence to the "yard stick".
Challenges to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime
( I ) Universality of the NPT
During 5 years between the 1995 and the 2000 NPT Review Conferences, 9 States,
including Brazil, the United Arab Emirates and Oman, joined the NPT. The Final Docu-
1
3) On the analysis of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, see Tariq Rauf, "An Unequivocal Success? Implications
of the NPT Review Conference," Art.耶Control Today, Vol. 30, No. 6, July/August 2000. pp. 9-16; Rebecca
Johnson, "The 2000 NPT Review Conference : A Delicate, Hard-Won Compromise," D伝蝣armament DかIomacy,
No. 46, May 2000, pp. 2-21; Thomas Graham, Jr., "Surviving the Storm: the NPT after the 2000 Review Con-
ference,"地rmament Diplo〝喝No. 46, May 2000, pp. 22-25; Jayantha Dhanapala, "Eliminati喝Nuclear
Arsenals: The NPT Pledge and What It Means," Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 47, July 2000, pp. 3-6.
4) NPT/CONF. 2000/28 (Parts I and II), 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Prolif-
eration of Nuclear Weapons, Final Docume鴫Volume I, New York, 2000.
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ment of the 2000 Conference encouraged States outside of the NPT to accede to the
Treaty. Cuba stated their intention to join the Treaty at the General Assembly of the
United Nation in September 2002, and joined the Treaty. It is welcomed that nuclear
non-proliferation regime is completely established in Central America. Only Israel, India
and Pakistan stay outside the Treaty.
India and Pakistan conducted nuclear explosions in May 1998. Althoughthe Final
Document of the 2000 Conference encouraged both States to refrain from the develop-
ment of nuclear weapons and to join the NPT, neither State has indicated their inten-
tions to do so. Both States consider that nuclear proliferation is not a problem of inter-
national relations but a domestic or regional issue regarding the balance of power be-
tween the States. A decision by either State to join the NPT seems unlikely in the near
future.
As for Israel, all Arab States in the Meddle East have become party to the NPT after
the 1995 Review Conference. In the Final Document, the Conference reaffirms the im-
portance of Israel's accession to the NPT and placement of all its nuclear facilities under
the comprehensive IAEA safeguards. However, given the current situation in the Middle
East, it will be difficult to achieve this goal of the Final Document. Additionally, no
practical progress toward the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle
East has been seen, although the UN General Assembly has unanimously adopted
resolutions encouraging its establishment.
Unfortunately, further progress toward universality seems unlikely for the foreseeable
future. The main issue remained now is how to deal with these hold-outs.
( 2 ) Nuclear Non-proliferation
Since 1995, nuclear-weapon States have clearly proliferated further. India, which con-
ducted peaceful nuclear explosion in May 1974, carried out nuclear weapon explosion
tests in May 1998, and Pakistan followed suit. They became defacto nuclear-weapon
States although it is unlikely that the international community would ever agree that
they should formally be designated as such.
Our apprehension is that India and Pakistan would keeptheir uncooperative attitude
toward the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and the States party to the
NPT would lose interest in resolving this problem, by taking a position that the situa-
tion is a particular problem between the two States and neighbors. Both States express
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their intentions to continue their development and deployment of nuclear weapons. The
situation exacerbates concerns regarding further proliferation by other States or non-
State actors with the assistance of either India or Pakistan.
After more than ten years, the disarmament and safeguards implementation issues in
Iraq have not been resolved. Recently, inspections by the IAEA and UNMOVIC in Iraq
were aggressively implemented under the UN Security Council resolution 1441 adopted
on November 9, 2002. While the IAEA and the UN continued the inspections for a while,
the U. S. with the U. K. started the use of force to disarm Iraq without clear authoriza-
tion from the Security Council. This policy of counterproliferation should be examined
cautiously whether it is permitted under the current rules of international law.
In October 2002, the DPRK has made known its plans to implement uranium enrich-
ment technology, presumably imported from Pakistan. This is contrary to the spirit of
the NPT and the Agreed Framework. The DPRK sent a statement on the withdrawal
from the NPT on January 10, 2003, and it took effect on April 10. Presently, the U. S.,
the ROK, Japan, China and Russia are looking for political solutions to the situation.
Due to the brinkmanship practiced by the DPRK, the policies of the intervening States
arenot clear.
( 3 ) Nuclear Disarmament5'
Although the NPT has, in essence, a nature of discrimination between the nuclear-
weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, many non-nuclear-weapon States agreed
onthe indefinite extension, becausethey expected that the NPT would be a suitable
way to prevent deterioration of the non-proliferation regime and that the nuclear-
weapon States would take actions toward nuclear disarmament. In the Principles and
Objectives of the 1995 Conference, they agreed the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear
weapons. In the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, an unequivocal
undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination oftheir
nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament was agreed.
However, while there has been some movement toward reducing the size of nuclear
arsenals, there has been little progress on nuclear disarmament. The Comprehensive
5) On the analysis of nuclear disarmament in the 2000 Final Document, see Mitsuru Kurosawa, "The NPT 2000
Review Conference and Nuclear Disarmament," Osaka University Law Review, No. 48, February 2001, pp.ト38;
Tanq Rauf, Towards NPT 2005: An Action Plan for the "13-Steps" towardsNuclear Disarmament agreed at
NPT 2000, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Affairs, 2000.
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Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signature in September 1996, that was the tim-
ing established by the 1995 Conference. The treaty has not yet entered into force, pri-
manly because也e condition for the entry into force is very hard and也e US has failed
to ratify. There is little hope for change in the near term.
Still the nuclear-weapon States are maintaining their moratorium on nuclear testing.
This moratorium provides a kind of political pressure against a State with the intention
to develop nuclear weapons. Explosive tests wi也out nuclear fission or sub-critical tests
are ca汀Ied out by the nuclear-weapon States. Advanced development by the nuclear-
weapon States to improve and assure the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons is
continuing.
As for the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), the Final Docu-
merit of the 2000 NPT Review Conference urged仇at the Conference on Disarmament
(CD) to agree on a programme of work for the immediate commencement of negotia-
tions with a view to their conclusion within 5 years. Several problems of an institutional
and procedural nature have delayed a decision by the CD to proceed, but it may be that
a more important obstacle to discussion in the CD is the hidden agenda of States that
have no interest in the cut-off of the production of fissile material for weapons. China
argues for the linkage between the FMCT and PAROS (prevention of arms race in outer
space).
The FMCT is a treaty mainly to prevent血e vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.
It is generally noticed that也e urgency attached to the discussion may be diluted because
the concern on the risk of horizontal proliferation is much stronger. However, the com-
mitment by the nuclear-weapan States to maintain也eir own non-proliferation posture
needs to be reinforced by the actions of the nuclear-weapon States, Israel, India and
Pakistan to take this step toward nuclear disarmament.
In May 2002, the U. S. and Russia signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
(Moscow Treaty). The Treaty requires both states to reduce by two thirds of their
deployed nuclear warheads within 10 years. Several problems, such as both States hav-
ing the freedom to select也e structure of their nuclear force and the Treaty does not
include "仇e principle of irreversibility", can be identified.
It is recognized that仇e content of the Moscow Treaty is almost the same as what the
U. S. insisted to eliminate nuclear warheads unilaterally. From the viewpoint of the
elimination of nuclear weapons by a legally binding docume鴫it can be appreciated.
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However, the Bush Administration has abandoned the START process, and START II
Treaty will not be implemented. The ABM Treaty lapsed in June 2002 by way of the U.
S. notification to withdraw from the Treaty in December 2001.
The Final Document of the 2000 Conference urges the early entry into force and full
implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible
while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stabiL
Ity and as a basis for further reductions in strategic offensive weapons. Compared with
previous treaties that provide a framework for nuclear arms control and disarmament
betweent the U. S. and Russia, the Moscow Treaty does not contain an elimination
schedule and does not obligate the parties to accept suitable verifications. Additionally,
both States can easily withdraw from the Treaty. Principle of flexibility, which the U. S.
emphasized, may be in the background of the Treaty, and it can be ranked in the con-
text of U. S. policy based on unilateralism.
Nuclear weapons material, declared to be excess to the national security requirements
of the U. S. and Russia, is coming under an IAEA verification regime in accordance with
the Trilateral Initiative. Large qualities of such material in the U. S. have been under
IAEA safeguards for several years. This development is welcomed as the agreement
includes "the principle of i汀eversibility" to establish confidence that the nuclear mate-
rials do not return to a military purpose.
( 4 ) Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones
The Final Document of也e 2000 NPT Review Conference welcomed the progress
toward establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones following the 1995　Conference.
However, despite the 2000 Conference's recognition of the important role which the
establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones and the signature to the protocols of
new and previously existing zones by nuclear-weapon States has played in extending
negative security assurances, further progress on nuclear-weapon-free zones has not
been made.
The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) was concluded in
June 1995, but has not entered into force. Entry into force requires the ratification of the
Treaty by 28 of the 54 African States. Cu汀ently only 16 States have ratified. Three of
the nuclear-weapon States-China, France and the U. K.-ratified the protocol to the
Treaty, but Russia and the U. S. have signed but not ratified it.
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In March 1997, Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Bang-
kok) entered into force. All the States in the ASEAN have ratified the Treaty. However,
no nuclear-weapon State has signed the protocol to the Treaty due to disagreements
over the definition of the zone which includes continental shelves and exclusive econom-
ic zones.
A proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia was contained in "the
Almaty statement" of February 1997. By September 2002, the five States constituting
the zone, i. e., Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan came to
an agreement. Early signatures and ratifications by也e states are required.
The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference adopted也e resolution on the Middle
East that, inter alia, encouraged the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The
2000 Conference recognizes the importance of Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons
as well as other weapons of mass destruction and urges them to seriously work toward
that end. The problems of Iraq and the Middle East in general have made it almost im-
possible to achieve progress.
A nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia seems to be a long way off.
( 5 ) Security Assurances
The Principles and Objectives of the 1995 Conference strongly encouraged the nuclear-
weapon States to take further steps regarding negative and positive security assurances
to the non-nuclear-weapon States. Additionally, the 2000 Conference agreed that legally
binding security assurances would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The
U. S. used conventional weapons to hunt down the Taliban and aLQaida in Afghanistan
and to bomb Iraq to disarm weapons of mass destruction and overthrow the Hussein
Regime. So far, the U. S. has never explicitly expressed the possibility that nuclear
weapons would be used against non-nuclear-weapon states.
In "the National Security Strategy of the United States of America" issued in Septem-
ber 2002 by the White House, President George W. Bush stated that the U. S. had long
maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient也reat to their
national security. With regard to President Bush's statement, it should be noted that the
U. S. may take a preemptive action even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place
of the enemy's attack. That would mean也ere might be a possibility for use of a small
nuclear weapon for preemptive actions to a potential threat.
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The explosive yield of some nuclear weapons has been reduced such that the differ-
ence between large conventional weapons and small tactical nuclear weapons is not
great. It may jeopardize the significance of nuclear non-proliferation. It should be con-
firmed that the subject of the nuclear disarmament include all nuclear weapons, not
only strategic nuclear weapons but also all tactical nuclear weapons without regard to
physical size or performance.
Al也ough the States party to the NPT agreed that legally binding security assurances
strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the U. S. policy contained in "National
Security Strategy" is clearly a retreat from the requirements in the Principles and Ob-
jectives of the 1995 Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 Conference.
( 6 ) Safeguards
By the early 1990s, weakness in the IAEA safeguards system that had failed to detect
violations of the comprehensive safeguards agreement based on the NPT and the NPT
itself by Iraq, was readily apparent. The IAEA obtained additional legal authority i. e.,
the additional protocol to safeguards agreement, in order to strengthen the detection
capability against diversions of declared nuclear materials as well as undeclared activ-
lties and nuclear material that might be used for the clandestine development of nuclear
weapons.
The Final Document of the 2000 Conference stressed that comprehensive safeguards
agreement and its additional protocol should be universally applied. The Conference
also noted the high priority that the IAEA attaches to the integration of traditional veri-
fication activities with the new strengthening measures based on the additional protocol.
Under the strengthened safeguards activities based on traditional material accountan-
cy safeguards and activities under the additional protocol, the IAEA obtained interna-
tional endorsement that the objective of safeguards is to assure the correctness and
completeness of State's declarations to deter and detect efforts to develop nuclear
weapons through facilities comprising the State's nuclear fuel cycle or any other clan-
destine facilities. The IAEA has worked aggressively toward the establishment of血e
new integrated safeguards system.
However, the problems connected to Iraq and the DPRK have not been resolved
through the strengthened safeguards systems. The universal application of the additional
protocol is also delayed. Even though the IAEA finalizes the technical development of
Challenges to the International Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime　　　　　　13
the strengthened safeguards system, if the Member States do not ratify the additional
protocol, the strengthened safeguards system cannot be implemented effectively. It
should be noted也at the universal application of the additional protocol is an essential
condition to enhance safeguards as well as the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
( 7 ) Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
Technical Cooperation (TC) Programme of仇e IAEA is progressing. Technical Coop-
eration increasingly provides a tangible socio-economic impact by contributing directly,
m a cost-effective manner, to the achievement of sustainable development priorities of
each country.
The regime of export control of nuclear material and specified equipment for nuclear
use has been enhanced by the addition of equipment relevant to plants for the conver-
sion of plutonium to the Trigger Lists. Further, the list of export controlled dual use
equipment was reviewed and amended through the London Guidelines in March 2000.
The IAEA's contributions to the operation of nuclear power reactors are also pro一
gressmg through the conclusion of the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear
Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel
Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Manageme鴫and the Convention
on Nuclear Safety. The Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material is now
being reviewed with intent to expand coverage.
( 8 ) Newly Emerging Threats
It is recognized that terrorism toward the nuclear industry by non-State actors with
enough resources has become a new threat for the nuclear non-proliferation regime. At
previous stages, the proliferation concerns were directed toward nation States, and the
problems relevant to the non-proliferation were discussed in international political fora.
Toward non-State actors, it is impossible to use political pressure based on an interna-
tional consensus. The international community including the nuclear industry must
develop and implement new strategies.
The threats are assumed as follows:
a. acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-State actors;
b. acquisition of nuclear materials by non-State actors;
c. acquisition of high-level radioactive material by non-State actors, including
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radio isotopes, and the manufacture of "dirty bombs"; and
d. sabotage of nuclear facilities by non-State actors.
Preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-State actors is an obligation
contained in Article I of the NPT. However, it is possible to assume that a State that
has already obtained the technology to develop nuclear weapons may provide such
information to non-State actors or that a state that has obtained undeclared weapon
usable nuclear materials could provide such materials to terrorist groups. Additionally,
there is the wo汀y that the actors could steal nuclear material or high-level radioactive
materials. Possibilities of an attack by non-State actors against nuclear facilities seem
real after the events of September ll, 2001.
Conclusion
An evaluation of the achievements of the Principles and Objectives resulting from the
1995 Review and Extension Conference and of the practical steps for nuclear disarma-
ment contained in the final document of the 2000 Review Conference leads to a pessi-
mistic view on the efforts to maintain and enhance the international consensus support-
ing the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Some progress can be found in strengthened safeguards and也e technical cooperation
by the IAEA, but progress elsewhere that needs international cooperation is either nega-
tive or non-existent. Around 1995, many countries including the U. S. worked very hard
to maintain the nuclear non-proliferation regime. However, after the decision was taken
to extend the Treaty indefinitely, many states seem to lose their enthusiasm to support
the regime.
The individual and practical activities are necessary to maintain the nuclear non-pro-
hferation regime. However, it must be achieved through也e intentions of States party to
the Treaty that value the objectives and benefits of the Treaty in order to maintain and
enhance the international consensus and motivation to comply with the obligations of
the NPT. New threat posed by non-State actors can only effectively be dealt with
through a renewed and universal commitment to the ideals and principles embodied in
the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
